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In this Article I want to give you an outsider’s view of international
law, or at least this outsider’s view. And by outsider I mean someone
who is usually interested in legal philosophy and constitutional law and
who may well be thought to lack standing to offer the sort of views and
criticisms that are to come.
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Yet brazenly, or otherwise, I am going to press on and do so anyway.
It may just be that only someone from outside the international law
fraternity or guild would have the inclination and motivation to attempt
this sort of critique. But even if that is overstating things, my hope is
that there may be a point or two in what follows that either pushes the
reader to be slightly more skeptical about the benefits of some aspects of
international law or provokes the reader to be angry, even if it just be
with me.
I am going to make these criticisms from the vantage of someone who
lives in one of the world’s oldest and longest standing democracies, say
someone living in the United States, Canada, Australia, or the United
Kingdom, all jurisdictions with which I am passingly familiar.
The structure of this Article will be simple. I will criticize certain aspects
of international law, especially rights-related international law, under the
three headings you see in the title to this Article. However, I am going to
take those headings and critiques in reverse order to lead with my best foot
forward. Yet first, as an entrée into those three headings and my overall
claims in this Article, I will lay out a short case study.
I. CASE STUDY TO INTRODUCE MY CRITICISMS
How many readers have found themselves unable to sleep some night
and so decided to have a read of the 1989 United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC)?1 Implausible I know, even for lawyers,
but it is not the worst strategy for overcoming insomnia. And in your
late-night browsing, you would come across Article 19 of that convention
or treaty.
Article 19 of the CRC reads in part as follows: “States Parties shall
take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational
measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental
violence . . . .”2 Now think about what you figure that covers and does
not cover. And remember, while doing so, that drafters have to word all
these multilateral treaties such as the CRC to get as many of the world’s
Sudans, Chinas, and Libyas on board as possible. Also, ignore for the
moment that the United States has never ratified the CRC.3 I am not
here focusing on, say, the failings of the U.N. Human Rights Council
1. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.
3, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1990/09/19900902%2003-14%20AM/
Ch_IV_11p.pdf.
2. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 19.
3. See Chapter IV Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (last updated Feb. 19, 2014, 1:02 PM).
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and its predecessor the Human Rights Commission—neither the way
authoritarian regimes manage to get voted onto these bodies nor the patently
unbalanced obsession they have with Israel. Both of those criticisms are
well known.4
No, my point here is something else, namely that it is not at all clear
what Article 19 of the CRC means. Yes, we know that a lot of countries
whose standards look pretty awful compared with those in the United
States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom have signed the
CRC. Additionally, we know that almost all countries at the time of
signing the CRC had municipal laws that permitted parents to spank
their own children if the degree of force was reasonable.5
But let us assume that some democratic government, say one like the
United States, Canada, Australia, or the United Kingdom, had a statute,
at the national or state level, that allowed parents to spank their children.
Would you say that that statute allowing corporal punishment breached
human rights? Let me put that question slightly differently. Would your
decision on whether parental corporal punishment infringed human
rights depend upon the proper interpretation of Article 19 of the CRC or
even be influenced in the least by Article 19? And if you thought parental
spanking did not breach human rights but you learned some overseas
international law experts thought otherwise—ones who were wholly
undemocratically chosen and included people from countries that were
undemocratic and even from downright authoritarian regimes—would
you defer to them?6 Would it matter to you in the least what this handful
of experts thought? Would it matter to you if these experts were giving
their opinions under the aegis of a United Nations body that monitors the
CRC treaty?

4. See, e.g., Brett Allen Casper, Ph.D. Candidate, New York University,
Authoritarian Regimes and the Exploitation of the UN Human Rights Council 1–2, 8 (May 3,
2013) (transcript available on the New York University, Department of Politics website).
5. See After the Fact, PARENTALRIGHTS.ORG, http://www.parentalrights.org/index.asp?
Type=B_BASIC&SEC=%7B6E783940-B0D5-495B-9702-512A961FEAF9%7D (last visited
Mar. 4, 2014).
6. Not all members of the Committee on the Rights of the Child are lawyers, of
course. The Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) always has only lawyers serving on it, but that is not true of the
other treaty committees. Also, note that unlike the representatives in the Human Rights
Council, the members of treaty committees are meant to serve in their individual capacities,
not as representatives of states—though the extent to which there is this independence is
variable or at least open to question in some instances.
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These are not off-the-wall questions; this is not a pointless hypothetical.
You see, all the big United Nations conventions or multilateral treaties,
including the CRC, have committees set up to monitor the implementation
progress of the conventions in all the states that have signed them.
Now at this point, you might like to know a couple of key things.
Firstly, the membership of these monitoring committees is determined in
a less than transparent way—nothing remotely close to how U.S. Supreme
Court Justices are picked—that comes nowhere near letting anyone
claim those selected have been democratically appointed or anointed.
Secondly, committee membership includes those from countries whose
leaders you would not take any moral advice from if your life depended on
it. Thirdly, and this is the point to take on board if you remember only
one, the committee for the CRC has consistently maintained7 that parental
corporal punishment violates the CRC.8
When you learn that fact, and fact it is, would your view of the
acceptability of parental spanking change? Let us assume it would not;
it certainly would make no difference to me. What if I told you, in
rather more grandiose terms, that international law required that you not
spank your children because such spanking was a breach of their human
rights as set out in Article 19 of the CRC? After all, this is what the
CRC committee thinks.9
Two roads now diverge. Go down one of them and you simply outsource
your view of the acceptability of spanking to the committee for the CRC.
You defer to this handful of international law experts, perhaps in the
name of complying with international law, because you think the committee
is best placed to know what the vague, amorphous Article 19 provisions
mean, or even due to your desire to take on board what Jeremy Waldron
has styled “the guidance of whatever consensus has been reached among
the nations on this point. . . . [A desire to turn] to the legal consensus of
civilized nations for assistance.”10
Whatever the reason for deferring to the committee and its view of the
reach, aegis, and ambit of Article 19, this is one option. Spanking breaches
human rights; this I know because international law and the committee
tell me so.

7. As this is a “committee” and not, say, the International Court of Justice, its
views are not made binding under the convention, but they are supposed to carry much
weight. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 45.
8. See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 8, 42d Sess.,
May 15–June 2, 2006, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/8 (Mar. 2, 2007).
9. See id.
10. Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 140, 144 (2005).
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Go down the other road, however, and you refuse to be swayed by
what this U.N. committee, set up to monitor the CRC, thinks. This refusal,
in its turn, can be motivated by two different concerns. In other words,
not very far down this second road you find that it splits or bifurcates.
One path focuses on international law itself, accepts its core-level
legitimacy in resolving such issues as parental corporal punishment but
makes legalistic arguments for why the committee is wrong in its
understanding of Article 19. These legalistic rejoinders would no doubt
focus on the legislative history of the CRC—what the states that signed
it intended it to cover—your claim being that they did not intend it to
cover parental spanking. To buttress this claim about the intentions of
the states that signed it, you would probably point to the fact that at the time
of signing, virtually all the countries signing the CRC had domestic legal
systems that allowed spanking. This would be external evidence of likely
intentions, it being unlikely that a government of a country with spanking
would knowingly sign a treaty forbidding spanking. And even if one or
two governments did, perhaps to sidestep the need to change domestic
law, it is implausible in the extreme that almost all governments signing the
CRC did this. Certainly, it is unlikely in the extreme that most democratic
governments did.
Notice that those who travel down this subbranch of the second road
do not make core-level objections to rights-based international law itself
being relevant, if not determinative. No, they effectively simply argue
for a different understanding of the proper meaning of Article 19. Where
the CRC committee seems to see Article 19 as a metaphorical living tree
whose reach and meaning are not determined by the intentions of those
states that signed it, those traveling down this subbranch want it interpreted
differently, perhaps according to some form of originalism or other. They
do not shun, reject, or belittle rights-based international law itself. They
may just reject the committee and its views in favor of the text itself, a
sort of Protestant approach11 to what international law does and does not
demand. In addition, no doubt some may seek a halfway house and say
this sort of international law is not determinative and conclusive, merely
a guide that is relevant and needs to be considered.
Of course this second road of refusing to be swayed by what the CRC
committee thinks about spanking has another subbranch. Travelers

11. This is not to say that I would want to frame the Committee on the Rights of
the Child as offering the Catholic approach, as it were.
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down this subbranch do not make legalistic arguments about how the
committee has erred in its understanding of what Article 19 covers. No,
much more fundamentally, they simply do not accept the core-level
applicability of rights-based international law to the question of whether
parents in some of the oldest democracies in the world can or cannot
spank their children. They not only dismiss the views of this handful of
U.N.-appointed committee members, they dismiss, too, the relevance of
rights-based international law itself to the issue. For many such travelers
down this second subbranch of this second road, it will be the fundamental
lack of democratic legitimacy when it comes to international law that
motivates their position. If issues such as parental spanking are covered
in whole or in part by an international law treaty couched in indeterminate,
abstract terms, then to what extent must it follow that the scope for
democratic decisionmaking and letting-the-numbers-count majoritarianism
in long-established democracies has been narrowed and enervated?
So this little case study leads on to my first critique, the charge that
too much international law is undemocratic in its origins and effects.
II. IT IS UNDEMOCRATIC
A. Nontreaty-Based—or Undressed—International Law
When talking of international law, there are two sorts. The sort most
lawyers—and virtually all laypeople—will be aware of and will think of
when someone mentions or refers to international law is the treaty-based
sort. Countries get together and agree to a treaty or convention. Perhaps
it is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),12 the CRC,13
or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.14 Not
all countries sign them. Not all countries ratify them. Some that do are
democratic countries; others that do are not—indeed some that sign are
out-and-out authoritarian regimes.
Amongst the democratic ones, the process for entering into and ratifying
these treaties will vary. Yet in all of them, it will involve some step that
confers at least some democratic legitimacy, as we will see below, though
of course the democratic respectability of treaties in jurisdictions such as
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom is less than it is in the
United States, noticeably less in fact. But it is not zero or nonexistent.

12. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
13. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1.
14. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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However, let us put that sort of treaty-based international law aside for
a moment and start elsewhere, with the sort that does not flow from
treaties or conventions. I am going to call this other sort of international
law, the sort that does not flow from treaties or conventions, “undressed
international law.” I call it that because it has not yet been dressed up or
formalized into a treaty. It has not yet been agreed to by any democratically
elected and accountable legislators or members of the executive branch.
This undressed international law is known in legal academic circles as
customary international law.15 Its content cannot be found by looking in
some treaty or convention, whether one’s country has signed and ratified
that treaty or not. No, this undressed international law that we now turn
to is the law that is inferred from the practice of states—or countries.
Once a consistent and general practice of states has been identified—and
note that this general state practice has to be something that is followed
out of a sense of legal obligation—then it becomes part of this undressed
international law and its binding legal norms. International custom is
that which has been identified as widespread state practice, when it has
been engaged in out of a sense of legal obligation.16
Now throughout that last paragraph, I deliberately used the passive voice.
I spoke of practices that “are inferred” and “have been identified” so as
intentionally to mask or gloss over the rather important question of who
gets to do all this inferring, identifying, and deciding just when it is and
is not that states are following some practice or other, and following it
out of a sense of legal obligation.
The beauty of the passive voice is that it can give the subtle impression
that these practices somehow identify themselves or that some omniscient
and unerring God is doing the identifying, inferring, and exercising of
otherwise fallible judgment. It can help remove from center stage the
fundamental issue of who precisely it is that makes these inferences,
identifies these practices, and decides not just that a practice exists but
that it is motivated by a sense of legal obligation.
In an article such as this, which critiques the undemocratic aspects of
too much international law, that simply will not do. So let us put away
this dissembling and finessing use of the passive voice and start by focusing

15. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1999).
16. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055.
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explicitly on these “who makes it?” and “where is the democratic input?”
questions.
Start with the former query. The unadorned answer is that what are
termed publicists determine this undressed international law. The Statute of
the International Court of Justice says it is “the most highly qualified
publicists” who have the role of determining this subsidiary sort of
international law.17
Many of those falling into the category of “publicists”18 are legal
academics; they are law professors.19 Not all law professors of course.
You have to be someone who is knowledgeable and writes in this field
of international law. So you have to show technical mastery in the field.
But you also have to demonstrate to those already recognized as being
highly qualified publicists that you have what Harvard law professor Mark
Tushnet describes as “soundness.”
Soundness seems to require that one be committed to the project of international
law, that is, to the proposition that nation-states ought to resolve an everincreasing number and ever-wider range of their disputes pursuant to existing
and emergent rules of international law rather than, for example, by economic
or, worse, military force.20

Let me be a bit blunter. No one gets to vote for these legal academic
publicists. They have no democratic warrant at all. Even if we assumed
that law professors as a group shared broadly similar political and moral
views to the population at large—and that assumption is plain-out false
and ridiculous21—this would still be immensely unrepresentative because
only those unskeptical about the benefits of an ever-increasing role and
scope for undressed, and dressed, international law can ever make it into
the club.
With a rather enjoyable dollop of understatement, Mark Tushnet goes
on to comment on this soundness criterion, this need to be committed to
the project, before an otherwise technically proficient law professor can
qualify as a publicist. Tushnet puts it rather drily as follows:
This feature of the process of becoming a publicist gives the academic field
some degree of self-containment. One is writing in part for other legal academics,
to achieve and sustain one’s position as a publicist. But only in part, because

17. Id.
18. See id. I will consider judicial decisions below.
19. See John O. McGinnis et al., The Patterns and Implications of Political
Contributions by Elite Law School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J. 1167, 1183 (2005).
20. Mark Tushnet, Academics as Law-Makers?, 29 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 19, 20
(2010).
21. In the United States, international law professors from elite universities
contribute to the Democrats over the Republicans by a ratio of nearly five to one. See
McGinnis et al., supra note 19, at 1182–83.
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one is also writing for others committed to the project of international law,
including notably decision-makers in institutions that clearly do make
international law, such as judges on international tribunals and members of the
International Law Commission.22

In terms of who makes this undressed or customary international law,
we have not yet moved beyond the part of publicists made up of law
professors, and already there are rather massive deficiencies in terms of
democratic input. First off, law professors as a whole are significantly to
the left of voters at large in their political and moral views. Secondly, it
is not all knowledgeable, technically accomplished international law
legal academics who get to be publicists and so get to identify these
practices of nation-states. It is only that portion of the law professors
who are considered sound when it comes to their commitment to the
international law project. Think of a self-selecting lawyerly caste of
committed experts, and you will get the general idea.
It is not difficult in the least to point out that excluding those who
have a modicum of skepticism about international law’s benefits is an
undemocratic roadblock or filter. On any theory of democratic
participation, thin or thick, the starting point is that you count everyone
equally.23 There are no “we do not like your views or values” exclusions
or filters at this initial stage. Yet that sort of exclusion or filter is precisely
what there is when it comes to who qualifies as a law professor publicist.
That makes this sort of law doubly deficient in democratic terms. Law
professors as a whole are nowhere near being representative of voters;
they are vastly more left wing on average, across the board, at least in
the cosmopolitan left-wing lawyers sense, if not the union left-wing
sense. Moreover, even amongst international law professors as a whole,
only true believers in the international law project have any realistic
prospect of becoming a publicist—someone who gets to infer and identify
what the supposed duty-motivated practices of states are and so tell us
the content of this undressed international law.
This is not letting-the-numbers-count democratic lawmaking.24 It is
more like lawmaking by a caste of experts with views known to diverge

22. See Tushnet, supra note 20, at 20.
23. I offer a thin theory of democracy in James Allan, Thin Beats Fat Yet Again –
Conceptions of Democracy, 25 LAW & PHIL. 533 (2006).
24. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) seems to pay more regular consideration
to the International Law Commission’s views, and the International Law Commission
has a more formalized system for eliciting and recording the views of states. But this
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from those of the majority or rather by those from that caste who can in
addition pass a test of ideological purity. When issues come up such as
over the death penalty, whether what is known as hate speech must be
criminalized, or how to structure labor laws, why should the laws on
these issues that have been decided by the elected representatives of the
voters be influenced in any way at all by customary international law—
by this thoroughly undemocratic, and doubly so, undressed international
law?
One of the trends of the recent past is that customary international law,
or undressed international law, has expanded its reach. It never used to
concern itself with a nation’s treatment of its own citizens. It very much
was about the “law of nations.”25 Restricted in that way, as it used to be,
one might still balk and say that a democracy such as the United States
or the United Kingdom is better placed to decide the advisability of, say,
preemptive war than some insular caste of publicists rummaging through
the entrails of supposedly perceived state practices. However, go back
before undressed international law expanded its reach into the realm of
how a nation-state treated its own citizens, and you can see that its scope
for conflict with majoritarian, letting-the-numbers-count, democratic
lawmaking is pretty small.
Perhaps I can make that point in a better way. If some journalist, NGO,
or law professor is going to accuse an elected government of violating
international law, of the undressed variety, the scope and ambit for doing
so are considerably smaller where that same undressed international law
confines itself to matters between nations. You might find a few accusations
about the illegality of preemptive war—though no doubt made in the
context of Iraq rather than Kosovo—but not much in addition to that.
However, allow undressed international law to inflate and expand its
supposed jurisdiction to include how a nation treats its own citizens and
the scope for conflict with the rules made by democratically elected
lawmakers multiplies exponentially, making suddenly relevant domestic
laws on hate speech, workplace relations, the death penalty, or anything
in fact that can be translated or transliterated into the language of human
rights.
Of course that comparative assessment—that domestic law looks better
in terms of quality, effectiveness, and legitimacy than international
law—is true of only democracies. With regard to most nondemocracies,
and certainly the military juntas, the theocracies, and the one-party
does not much detract from my claim as to democratic deficiency. See Statute of the
International Court of Justice, supra note 16, art. 50.
25. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 777 (2001).

842

[VOL. 50: 833, 2013]

The IOUs of—Too Much—International Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

states, international law looks better than domestic law when it comes to
how a nation treats its own citizens. In other words, there is an
asymmetry at work, even regarding legitimacy. The wilder exponents of
cultural relativism may wish to dissemble at this point or brazenly claim
that international law is better than the domestic law of both
nondemocracies and democracies.
That sort of “international law is better” response fails both for being
untrue and also for being somewhat—or wholly—inconsistent. It is
untrue because as a plain matter of empirical fact, democracies produce
superior domestic laws to nondemocracies, pretty much across the board
but especially when it comes to the sort of individual liberty and freedom
entitlements that lie at the heart of those matters labeled “human rights
concerns.” Democracies are not just a little bit superior; they are massively
so. And these domestic laws of democracies are superior to international
law as well, not just because the treaty-based sort requires compromises
to get nondemocracies on board but because the undressed sort is made
by such an unrepresentative and unaccountable cohort.
One might be tempted, I suppose, to pretend that undressed international
law is superior to all versions of domestic law, whether it comes from
nondemocracies or democracies, and indulge in this pretense simply as a
ruse to allow international law’s precepts to prevail in nondemocracies
where they would clearly be an improvement. This would amount to the
“little white lie” school of thinking. It would run something as follows:
“I will assert the superiority and jurisdictional dominance of undressed
international law over all types of domestic law, not because it is true but
simply because I calculate that that fiction or sleight of hand will have
the best chance of extending the norms of undressed international law in
the world’s nondemocracies. And the benefits of that would outweigh
the costs, negatives, and downsides of having them leech into the world’s
democracies.”
One might be tempted by that line of thinking, but it is a temptation to
be resisted. Here is its fatal flaw or conceit. The world’s nasty regimes will
ignore undressed international law when it comes to how they treat their
own citizens, and they will ignore it regardless of how far these international
law norms influence and reshape things in the world’s democracies.
That is the irony. If your unspoken goal is to reform nondemocracies for
the better by proclaiming the superiority and preeminence of undressed,
and no doubt dressed, treaty-based international law, you will find that
that does not come to pass. Instead, you will end up influencing only the

843

democracies and on balance for the worse. Therein lies the irony or flaw
in this little-white-lie way of thinking.
So in my view, any assertions along the lines that international law is
better than the domestic law of democracies as regards how to deal with
the democracies’ own citizens is untrue, and doubly so when we factor
in the legitimacy benefits of “rule by the people” as opposed to “rule by
international law publicists.” That said, such assertions about the supposed
superiority of undressed international law are also inconsistent in a way.
At least that is the case if the first step or prong in the argument involves
an unwillingness to say that the domestic laws of democracies, on average,
over time, and overwhelmingly, are markedly superior to and better than
those of nondemocracies. Let us suppose one subscribes to a version of
cultural relativism that forecloses judging between the laws of democracies
and nondemocracies.
My point is that if you feel you cannot judge between the domestic
law of democracies and nondemocracies, weighing them up in terms of
their competing effectiveness, legitimacy, and overall consequences,
then you surely must also be foreclosed from asserting that undressed
international law is better than or superior to any sort of domestic law,
whatever its provenance. Thinking you are not in a position to be able to
judge any X better than Y is not a worldview that you can turn on and off
at will, when convenient, or when it suits your core-level political
preferences.
Thus far we have considered only one group of contributors to undressed
international law—those international law professors who not only have
sufficient technical expertise but who also have been adjudged
thoroughly sound and committed to its ongoing and expanding reach and
influence. True, it is not at all clear or definite who it is that dispenses
the “you are sound” label or guarantee. True, this group is in no way at all
democratically chosen, accountable, or representative; indeed, as a
group, it is self-selecting or self-appointed. These publicists may have
virtues when it comes to their role as lawmakers, but none of those
virtues has any connection at all to democracy.
We can see this in plain terms from one unashamed supporter, who
tells us flat out that nation-states do not make customary or undressed
international law. No, “[i]t is made by the people that care; the professors,
the writers of textbooks and casebooks, and the authors of articles in
leading international law journals.”26

26. Louis B. Sohn, Sources of International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 399,
399 (1996).
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As for evenhandedness, well, here is how the late Lord Rodger, then
of the U.K.’s new Supreme Court—formerly known as the Judicial
Committee of the House of Lords and still its top court—assesses that:
My impression is that much of the writing on public international law to
which we are referred is slanted towards a particular result that the writer
wishes to see prevail as the law. It often appears that the writers have, say, a
particular human rights agenda and that their book or article is written with a
view to securing that it will come to form part of the corpus of writings which
help to shape the law. Indeed, often the writers sit on some international
tribunal or other body which deals with the same matter. On occasions, however,
it is difficult to see how the writer’s argument is to be squared with the
wording of the particular international instrument in question – however
desirable the result may be.27

That being so, and this being the highly unrepresentative and
nonmajoritarian group that it is, it follows that as undressed international
law expands its reach, scope, and authority in the democratic world, the
result is at least some lessening or contraction of the scope, reach, and
authority of majoritarian, democratic decisionmaking. We may still count
everyone as equal and let the numbers count in the United States, Canada,
Australia, and the United Kingdom, but they will count for less than they
did before this expansion of undressed international law. Democracy, if
only in small part and at the margins, will have declined.
The picture for majoritarian democrats does not improve when we
turn to the other main group of people who make undressed international
law.28 These are the judges, the international law judges.
Here we need to consider the United Nations’ International Court of
Justice (ICJ) and the fifteen judges who sit on this court. Depending on
how you categorize Venezuela and Russia, between a third and a half of
the ICJ judges come from nondemocracies, which is a more circumspect
and polite way of indicating that they hail as well from repressive,
authoritarian regimes such as Sierra Leone, China, and Morocco.29 Given
how they are selected, they lack even the indirect democratic credentials

27. Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Judges and Academics in the United Kingdom, 29
U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 29, 39 (2010).
28. Article 38(1)(d) also authorizes having regard to national court decisions on
the content of international law as a subsidiary or evidentiary source of law. See Statute
of the International Court of Justice, supra note 16, art. 38(1)(d).
29. The current court includes members from China and Morocco; Sierra Leone
had a member on the court up until 2012. The Court: All Members, INT’L CT. JUST.,
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=2 (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
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of top judges appointed by the elected branches—the United States,
Canada, and Australia—and then subject to a transparent and sometimes
unsuccessful confirmation hearing—the United States.
But I will postpone discussion of how ICJ judges are appointed until
my discussion of the opaqueness of international law in my second
heading below. Suffice it here to note that the democratic credentials of
the international law judges, those on the ICJ, are vanishingly slight to
nonexistent. And then let us move on to the better-known sort of
international law.
B. Treaty-Based International Law
When we turn to look at treaty-based international law and its democratic
credentials, we first need to distinguish the United States and our three
other Westminster democracies of Canada, Australia, and the United
Kingdom. You see, the democratic credentials of treaties are much higher
in the United States. That is because treaties with other countries—
bilateral or multilateral—cannot come into force in the United States
until they have been passed by the elected upper house of the legislature,
the Senate, and on a two-thirds approval basis at that.30 This is not true in
the United Kingdom; it is not true in Canada; it is not true in Australia. In
all of these latter three jurisdictions, the executive branch of government
can ratify treaties without any veto resting in, or any need to win a vote
in, one of the elected legislatures. That means that in the United States,
President Clinton could sign the Kyoto Treaty but that it could not bind
the United States until approved by the Senate, which approval never
ended up being given.31 The same goes for submitting to an international
criminal court or any sort of cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme for
carbon dioxide between countries. You need Senate approval that is not
always forthcoming because of the fact that the President’s party does
not always control the Senate, because of greater likelihood in a U.S.
presidential system of legislators crossing party lines, and because of the
supermajoritarian threshold for achieving treaty passage.
By contrast, in Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, the executive
branch of government is not forced to obtain the approval of elected
legislators. No, the executive branches of government in those three
Westminster systems, using the prerogative power, can sign, enter into,
and ratify treaties all on their own. So bear that difference in mind in

30.
31.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See SUSAN R. FLETCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30692, GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 2 (2005).
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what follows, as much more of the gravamen in this subpart is directed
at these three non-U.S. countries.
Having noted that, let us turn back to our case study, my example of
the CRC and spanking, to consider two ways in which international law
of the treaty-based kind is democratically deficient. Now as it happens,
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom32 have all ratified or signed
the CRC, unlike the United States.33 And as I have just noted, doing so
in a Westminster system is easier than in the United States. The executive
can do so without any veto or blocking power lying in the hands of any
part of the legislature. Therefore, ratified treaties or conventions clearly
have less democratic legitimacy in Canada, Australia, and the United
Kingdom than they do in the United States. Indeed this point is often
overlooked. When it comes to treaty-based international law and its
democratic credentials, the United States looks better than any of our
other three longstanding democracies.
Now if you go back forty or fifty years, there was a tradeoff outside
the United States for this lack of legislative input when it came to treaties
and conventions. That tradeoff was simply this: The executive could
ratify and sign treaties all by itself under the prerogative power, yes. But
such treaties did not, let me doubly stress that negative, become part of
the country’s domestic law. It applied, perhaps, internationally. It did
not apply domestically—not unless it was incorporated into the country’s
internal laws by also being passed by the elected legislature as a statute.
In the absence of a ratified treaty being explicitly incorporated into
domestic law in this way, it was not a source of valid law. You could
not argue in court that you should win because of this or that treaty; you
could not argue that the written constitution meant this, rather than that,
because of some treaty; and only at the margins, when there was clear

32. This basic position was altered in the United Kingdom by the Constitutional
Reform and Governance Act 2010, sections 20–23, allowing Parliament to pass a
resolution not to ratify a treaty. See Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, 2010,
c. 25, §§ 20–23 (U.K.). However, under section 22, any minister may opt not to refer a
treaty to Parliament and so bypass this new “ask Parliament” regime entirely and without
any recourse by the legislature. See id. § 22. In addition the upper house has no real “do
not ratify” power under this statute. And section 23 exempts certain categories of treaty
entirely. See id. § 23. So on balance I believe that my main claim here as regards the United
Kingdom remains largely correct.
33. See Chapter IV Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra
note 3.
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ambiguity, could you even argue that a statute meant X rather than Y
because of this, that, or the other treaty.
In that now bygone world, the American approach to treaties and
conventions was in fact not more democratic than the approach in the
Westminster world. Sure, the Americans took treaties more seriously back
then and one might have made an argument for the U.S. approach on
that basis, that we should not ratify a treaty unless we are prepared to
make it enforceable law. That sort of argument would cash out in rule of
law terms or don’t deal in aspirations terms. But in no sense was the
old Westminster approach to treaties any less democratic than the U.S.
approach. Americans did, and do, take treaties very seriously indeed and
demand that they pass through the elected upper house Senate. Our
three Westminster countries did not, and do not, demand this, but then, a
half century ago, any and all executive-ratified treaties did not become
part of the domestic law. Your average voter could ignore them. Full stop.
That is no longer the case in our three Westminster countries. Judges
have changed that. Administrative law, the rules and regulations below
the level of statute law and including judge-made ones about how
tribunals must operate and who must be heard, became permeated with
rules plucked by judges from these treaties. Then statutes started to be
interpreted with reference to these treaties from international law. It did
not matter that the treaties were not in orthodox terms part of the
domestic law in Westminster systems. The lack of democratic legitimacy
compared with a U.S.-type setup for ratifying treaties did not matter to
the judges either.
You know the game. First you start by appealing to treaties, however
vague, amorphous, indeterminate, or couched in moral abstractions—
“all appropriate . . . measures to protect the child from . . . violence”34—
when the statute is ambiguous, and only then. That seems fairly harmless.
So after a while, once that has bedded down, you go further. You make
what the treaties say the presumptive way of interpreting all statutes so
that only explicit, clear words in the statute overcome that presumption.
No good reason is given for why this should be the default position or
why an unincorporated treaty with patently flawed democratic credentials
should have such power to influence the meaning of the legislature’s
statutes, some enacted before the treaty was even signed and ratified.
You just move on as though it is self-evident that democratically enacted
statutes ought to be interpreted through the prism of this sort of treatyand-convention-focused international law.

34.
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From there it is a moderately short step to using these unincorporated
treaties as filters for interpreting the written constitution. That is what
happens in Canada, though Australia still holds out against that last step,
barely.35 Meanwhile in the United Kingdom, there is no written constitution,
which forecloses this final step of using unincorporated treaties as filters
for the task of constitutional interpretation. Alas, that means only that using
them to help decide what statutes mean in the United Kingdom is even
more problematic and potentially countermajoritarian. There, statutes
matter more. So interpreting them through the prism of treaties matters
more too.
I said above that there are two ways in which international law of the
treaty-based kind is democratically deficient, and I have now outlined
the first way. It happens in our three Westminster countries when treaties
that have been signed and ratified are used by judges to help make and
remake administrative law and also to aid in interpreting statutes and
constitutional provisions even to the point of making these treaties the
default, presumptive positions of what statutes mean. And all this even
though these treaties and conventions have not been incorporated into
domestic law and are not, on the orthodox understanding that takes
democratic concerns seriously, part of the domestic law. That is the
first way, and it applies to only our three Westminster countries.
The second way is worse. This second way happens most publicly and
most notoriously in the United States, possibly because of the very fact
that Americans take ratifying treaties very seriously indeed and expect
them to win clear democratic support at least in the Senate.
What happens on this second scenario, and it is not easily defended if
you are a democrat, is this: Judges once again are interpreting domestic
legal texts such as statutes and constitutional provisions, just as above.
And again, the judges are doing this interpreting by referring to treaties
or conventions—they may be looking to the treaties for evidence of
international views on some issue, or for a moral consensus on some
rights-based disagreement, or to see what meaning to give some morally
charged phrase or term, or something else. For our purposes that is not
the point when it comes to this second way in which treaty-based
international law is democratically wanting, deficient, and exiguous.
What is the point is that in this second scenario, the treaties and conventions
the judges use have not even been ratified. For example, they have
35.

See Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 589–93 (Austl.).
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failed to win a majority vote in the Senate, if we focus on the United States
for a moment. These are therefore unratified treaties without the imprimatur
or approval of the domestic democratic politics. Either the treaty failed
to win Senate approval, it was not even put to the Senate, or the President
himself did not sign it. And yet the judges use such a treaty to help them
interpret, say, the U.S. Constitution.
This is precisely what happened back in 2005 in Roper v. Simmons.36
The U.S. Supreme Court in that case cited the CRC in the course of
deciding what no “cruel and unusual punishment” meant in the Eighth
Amendment.37 The issue for those Justices was whether the U.S. Bill of
Rights meant they could strike down or invalidate democratically enacted
laws that allowed for the possibility of executing juveniles.38
In deciding that question, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court
Justices, as I said, cited the CRC, the very same CRC from my above case
study.39 But here is the thing. The United States has never ratified this
CRC.40 It has no democratic standing or pedigree at all. None. Zero.
And yet it is being used to tell us what the over two centuries-old U.S.
Bill of Rights and its Eighth Amendment mean.
It does not stop there. In that same case, the Justices—or those in the
majority—cited another treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).41 This treaty had been ratified by the United
States, or rather most of it had. Not all of it though. The United States
had entered a formal reservation against the ICCPR’s no death penalty
provision, meaning that part of the treaty did not apply in the United
States.42 But the Justices in Roper cited it anyway in the context of a death
penalty case.
Let me be blunt. Top American Justices, in the course of deciding
whether they would gainsay and overrule democratically elected legislators
by invalidating one of their statutes, decided to cite and give weight to
treaties that the elected political branches had rejected; they cited and
gave weight to treaty-based international law that the elected branches
36. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
37. See id. at 576.
38. See id. at 555–56.
39. Id. at 576.
40. UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 2012, at 16 (2012), available
at http://www.unicef.org/sowc2012/pdfs/SOWC%202012-Main%20Report_EN_13Mar
2012.pdf.
41. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 567. The treaty cited to is the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14.
42. See Chapter IV Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails
.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (last updated Feb. 19, 2014,
1:02 PM).
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had specifically and explicitly refused to incorporate into domestic law.43
These top U.S. Justices, and it is only fair to say it was not all of them,
exercised their countermajoritarian, antidemocratic Bill of Rights power
to strike down statutes but not before referring to, considering, citing,
and presumably giving at least some weight to an international treaty that
the democratically accountable branches had rejected. To put it mildly,
this certainly raises issues of democratic legitimacy.
Now supporters of this sort of use of nonratified treaty-based international
law will point out that the top U.S. Justices who did this said they
decided based on domestic materials and mentioned or cited the CRC
and ICCPR only as “confirmation” of what they had anyway decided,
namely to invalidate a democratically enacted law.44 Some supporters
might even try to make a more subtle point. They might suggest that
these majority Justices were using these nonratified treaties as evidence
of a consensus of the practice of other states, not as part of an attempt to
discern some norm of international law.
However, those attempts, and others, to explain away and legitimate
this second way of using treaty-based international law will not satisfy
the person like me who is worried about how this all encroaches on
democracy. Not by a long shot.
Yet some past and present U.S. Supreme Court Justices vigorously
defend this, and reliance on international law more generally, when
speaking extrajudicially. Take just a few examples. Justice Stephen
Breyer is a committed advocate of using international law in this way
and indeed was one of those in the majority in Roper who did so.45
Justice Ruth Ginsburg can be described in similar terms and was on the
same majority side in Roper.46 In 2005, when giving the keynote address to
the Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law, Justice Ginsburg was vigorous in her defense of citing, referring to,

43. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003); Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 707 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
734 (1997).
44. See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward
Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 654–59
(2007).
45. See Daniel Bodansky, The Use of International Sources in Constitutional Opinion,
32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 421, 424 (2004).
46. 543 U.S. at 554.
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and appealing to international law.47 She saw that as one of the “common
denominators of basic fairness . . . between the governors and the
governed.”48 Even Republican-appointed former Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, giving the keynote address to the same society three years
earlier, said that “conclusions reached by . . . the international community
should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts.”49
However, take the debate down from the Olympian heights of
disagreement-finessing abstractions to the quagmire of drawing highly
contestable social policy lines—ones having to do with the death penalty
and perhaps one day whether parents can spank their children—and it is
not at all clear to me why treaty-based international law should influence
in any way at all how the U.S. Bill of Rights is interpreted. It is out-andout democratically illegitimate to pay any heed at all to a nonratified
treaty such as the CRC.
The authoritative scope for deciding issues via domestic democratic
structures goes down—it reduces, declines, or becomes smaller—when
judges appeal to nonratified treaties in the United States to influence in
any way how they interpret important legal texts. The same is true when
judges in our three Westminster countries appeal to any treaties at all,
even ratified ones, to give meaning to their important legal texts, leaving
to one side instances where a treaty is put into the form of a statute and
incorporated into domestic law by being passed by the legislature.
This all means that the partisan of democratic decisionmaking can
complain that the field that was formerly left for resolving issues by the
elected branches has been narrowed and shrunk, at least at the margins,
by this appeal to treaty-based international law, be it unratified ones in
the United States or ratified ones in our other longstanding democracies.
III. IT IS OPAQUE
Over two centuries ago, the philosopher, prison reformer, advocate of
ever greater democracy, and legal commentator Jeremy Bentham—
famous today still for his exposition of the doctrine of utilitarianism50—
47. See Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of
[Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication,
Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Apr. 1, 2005), in 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 351, 354–55 (2005).
48. Id. at 354 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Sixth
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 15, 2002), in 96
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348, 350 (2002).
50. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., Methuen & Co. 1982)
(1789) (discussing the principle of utility).
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attacked the common law.51 Bentham thought there were big problems
with this sort of judge-made law that we in the United States, Canada,
Australia, and the United Kingdom all call “the common law.” First off,
it was retrospective.52 Judges made it at the point of application at the
end of a lawsuit, focused on things that had already happened so that any
changes in doctrine, however they might be dressed up, effectively had
altered the rules of the game for the side that had relied on how things
stood before this change of doctrine—for an anachronistic instance, the
duties owed by a manufacturer to consumers of those goods not in a
contractual relationship with that manufacturer. The contrast with statute
law enacted by an elected legislature and set to come into force on some
specified future date could not be any more stark as regards this issue of
the retrospectivity of the common law.
The next problem Bentham identified was related to that first one.
You see, in order to mask that retrospective element, many supporters of
the common law talked as though the real, true common law had always
been out there in the ether.53 For them, any change in doctrine announced
by the judges amounted to telling the rest of us what had always been the
correct understanding of the law. It just had not been properly understood
as such until now.
Think of this as the “one right answer,” or “judges just discovering what
was always out there,” or “it was implicitly part of the best understanding of
the settled case law, though earlier judges had not yet recognized it”
view of the common law. It solved the problem of retrospectivity. But
the cure was in various respects worse than the disease. It was worse
because it rested on a patent and palpable fiction, that judges were not
ever making law at the point of application. No, they were merely
announcing what had always been the law or the best understanding of
earlier case law. Bentham had a field day with such claims, which rely
on pretending that judge-made law, the common law, does not involve
any discretionary input by the judges who definitively decide a case.54
So this was another ground he had for disparaging the common law.

51. See GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 147–
260 (1986).
52. Id. at 207–08.
53. See id. at 194, 208.
54. See id. at 274.
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Bentham also thought this common law was too unsystematic and
unfocused on achieving the greatest happiness of the greatest number.55
He also saw this sort of judge-made law as extremely opaque and
supremely undemocratic.56 Those who extolled the common law at least
had to concede, thought Bentham, that it was the product of an
unrepresentative, unaccountable lawyerly caste—“Judge & Co.”—
whose views, interests, and values often could and sometimes did differ
from those of the majority.57 In such circumstances, why should the
judges’ views become law? On what grounds was that legitimate?
In my view much of the Benthamite critique of the common law, the
ruthless debunking of its pretensions and illegitimacies, also applies to
customary international law. I have already pointed out above some of
the antidemocratic failings of this sort of undressed international law,
and indeed of the treaty-based sort as well. Yet although one of Bentham’s
core grievances had to do with the undemocratic nature of “Judge &
Co.” common law, the charge of its opaqueness or opacity was also
prominent.
International law can also quite fairly be charged with being opaque,
more opaque than the domestic law of longstanding democracies such as
the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. For
instance, let us return to how the fifteen judges of the ICJ are appointed.
To become an ICJ judge, a candidate needs to be approved by both a
majority of General Assembly countries and a majority of Security Council
countries.58 As you would expect, this is a process chock full of lobbying,
vote trading, and buying amongst regional blocs and other sorts of
groupings. In that sense it is a highly politicized process, indeed one
where luck and fortuitous timing play a big role. Having conceded that,
you can see too that the appointments process for ICJ judges is nothing
like the U.S. system for appointing and confirming Supreme Court
Justices or judges.59 Both are politicized but in different ways. The U.S.
system forces candidates to answer highly charged questions. Those
questions can be evaded, true, but they nevertheless get to be asked in a
very public way. Also, the nominee’s personal outlook and sensibilities
can be raised. Most noticeably, candidates once nominated are sometimes

55. See id. at 204.
56. See id. at 204–05.
57. See id. at 205.
58. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 16, arts. 4, 10.
59. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving the President the power to appoint
“Judges of the supreme Court”).
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rejected and blocked.60 In other words, there is a form of public deliberation,
albeit an attenuated one.
The ICJ appointments procedure is opaque to a high degree in
comparison. It is backroom, horse-trading, factional politics, where
geography is a big factor.61 Even within democratic countries, the
nominating of an ICJ candidate is insulated from any direct governmental
input—an insulation that may be desirable when it comes to authoritarian
regimes, though I suspect such regimes have more tools for getting their
preferred candidate nominated anyway, but not to democratic ones.
Take the United States. The President does not nominate American
candidates for ICJ openings. Instead, nominations are made by something
called a “national group” at the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The
Hague. It is the members of these national groups that are nominated by
national governments.62 In a democracy, where a government’s recourse
in the face of an unwanted nomination is highly constrained, these groups
are insulated from public accountability and control by the elected
government. In nondemocracies, as I suggested above, governments
probably have tools for getting their national group to give them the nominee
they want, tools that are unavailable, and unwanted, in a democracy.
On top of all that, the ICJ is not well known to citizens of democratic
countries, or to those of nondemocratic nations. The percentage of
Americans that could name even a single ICJ judge, whether American
or otherwise, would be vanishingly small. The same goes for citizens of
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. New Zealand might possibly
do marginally better on this count because its first ever ICJ nominee,
Professor Kenneth Keith, made it successfully onto the court in the

60. For example, in 1987, the Senate blocked the nomination of Robert Bork.
CNN Library, Supreme Court Nominations Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/
08/27/us/supreme-court-nominations-fast-facts/ (last updated Aug. 27, 2013, 5:16 PM).
61. See SPENCER ZIFCAK, UNITED NATIONS REFORM: HEADING NORTH OR SOUTH?
9 (2009); Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the
Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 278–79 (2003). For a
general critique of judicial hubris when it comes to international law and to American
judges citing international law, see Maimon Schwarzschild, Judicial Independence and
Judicial Hubris, in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS
AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 177, 182–85 (Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds.,
2012).
62. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 16, arts. 4–5.
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relatively recent past.63 But the self-congratulatory press for that milestone
has long since ebbed away, so it is probably much the same in New
Zealand as elsewhere. The ICJ gets little press; it is poorly understood;
and its judges are unknown, even in legal circles, except those working
in the field of international law. Put bluntly, the top court itself has its
judges chosen in an opaque—and undemocratic—way, and it operates
overwhelmingly outside the public gaze, which is another sort of
opaqueness.
Then there is the issue of the reach of undressed customary international
law, and whether it is quietly expanding unknown to most citizens in our
four longstanding democracies. Of course it may well be that judges on
all courts have some interest in increasing the jurisdiction of the court on
which they serve. They will be subject to a temptation to increase that
jurisdiction, to widen the numbers and sorts of cases their court can hear.
Some judges resist this jurisdiction-expanding temptation better than
others, but all are subject to it. So it is at least plausible to assert that the
judges of the ICJ have an incentive or stake in discerning, discovering,
or asserting a wider—or indeed ever wider—scope for this sort of
customary international law. This will certainly be so when jurisdiction
expands to encompass how a nation treats its own citizens. Yet it will
also be affected by the extent of discretionary power that these ICJ judges
have when it comes to stating how far this undressed international law
does, and does not, extend.
Now as it happens, I think a case can be made that customary
international law is expanding its reach, and in an opaque way. There is
a ratchet-up effect at work. United States law professors John McGinnis
and Ilya Somin attribute some of this ratchet-up effect or trend to a split
amongst two schools who see undressed international law in quite
different ways. The older school, what they call the “classicists,” “believe
that customary international law must be rooted in the widespread consensus
of the actual practices of nation-states.”64 The job of publicists, on this
view, is to look to see what states actually do. It is a question of fact,
even on the ancillary issue of what motivates any state action.
Readers will notice that even on this classicist understanding, there
will be disagreement. People disagree about facts all the time. And any
particular publicist of classicist leanings might think the content of
undressed international law is X while a fellow classical school member

63. See Audrey Young & Helen Tunnah, NZ Knight Elected Judge of World’s Top
Court, NEW ZEALAND HERALD (Nov. 9, 2005, 5:00 AM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/
article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10354326.
64. John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our
Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1199 (2007).

856

[VOL. 50: 833, 2013]

The IOUs of—Too Much—International Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

might think it is X + A, X – Y + B, or anything else. But their disagreement
about content will be focused on facts, on what the actual practice of
states is, and on whether such practices, when widespread, are motivated
—as a matter of fact—by a sense of legal obligation.
That will make the content of undressed international law inherently
debatable and contentious. But notice how much freer of a sense of moral
proselytizing and morally pregnant human rights presuppositions it is
compared with the alternative.
That alternative to this older, classical school is the newer, “modern”
school. Professors McGinnis and Somin describe it as follows:
Under a more modern concept of international custom, many scholars embrace a
methodology that permits substantial human rights norms to be encompassed
within customary international law. They relax the classical standards in several
ways that accomplish this. Instead of requiring that nation-states actually
engage in a practice, they substitute statements by nation-states that give the
norms verbal endorsement. These include resolutions of the General Assembly of
the United Nations and multilateral treaties.65

Very, very few people, lawyers included, are aware of this move away
from an objective—if contentious and disputable—search for what states
do66 to something less factual and more value-laden that builds in a
substantial moral component or human rights input regardless of whether
such norms are adhered to in fact or not—and despite the inherently
debatable and disputable—and virtually always disputed—nature of human
rights norms once they are brought down from the Olympian heights of
moral abstractions and applied to real-life issues in the quagmire of dayto-day social policymaking. And so, any such process can be considered
to be an opaque one.
This newer, modern school relaxes the need to find actual widespread
state practice or what states really do. It relaxes that factual quest in favor
of a more morally pregnant or substantive quest to say what states should
do. All that is needed are mere statements of verbal endorsement.
First off, it seems to me that this newer, modern approach has more
scope to make inroads into democracy by taking the second component
of “acting out of a sense of legal obligation” and turning it from a question
65. Id. at 1200 (footnotes omitted).
66. I concede that the distinction between what states do and what they say is not
by any means watertight. The latter might always provide some basis for the former. So
the point here is a relative one, the extent to which the latter is relied upon. Or so it
seems to me.
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of fact—“Is this why states do X?”—into one more morally pregnant—
“Is this an instance in which we can infer that states should feel obliged
to do this based on what they have said?”. This is a move from an “is”
not directly to an “ought” but rather to a sort of combination “is or ought.”
In my view this second question has more jurisdiction-expanding potential.
Yet secondly, and even if you disagree with that first claim, the more
normatively charged “is plus ought” determination is a less transparent,
more contestable, and more opaque determination than the straight out
factual “is” one. And that gives more open-ended discretionary power to
publicists—meaning a handful of “sound” international law professors—
and to a few international law judges appointed in the most opaque way
imaginable.
IV. IT IS INEFFECTIVE
My third critique of international law, or rather of some aspects of
international law, is that it is comparatively ineffective. H. L. A. Hart,
over fifty years ago, noted that there is a difference in the scope of
enforceability between municipal law aimed at individual human beings
and international law aimed at countries. As regards the former, everyone
is more or less equal; as regards the latter, single states can be stronger
than all the rest combined. Effective enforcement of the law in the case
of the former is theoretically much easier than with the latter, where all
may depend upon the “stronger than all the rest State” voluntarily
complying with some law for it to be effective at all.67
Or if we leave aside that sort of Hartian theoretical point about the
enforceability of international law, it might be tempting here to rehearse
a different sort of critique about ineffectiveness, say the well-known
criticisms of various subsidiary parts of the United Nations—some of the
second-tier agencies of the United Nations, and more particularly, the
rights-related ones. Take today’s U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC).
This is an intergovernmental body, subsidiary to the U.N. General
Assembly.68 In 2006, it replaced the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.69
The council was created to replace the commission because the latter was
widely seen to be—according to taste—ineffective, overly politicized,

67. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 231 (1961).
68. Welcome to the Human Rights Council, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. COUNCIL,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx (last visited Mar. 4,
2014).
69. Eric Cox, State Interests and the Creation and Functioning of the United Nations
Human Rights Council, 6 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 87, 88 (2010).
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controlled by voting blocs from the world’s despotic regimes, anti-Israel,
anti-United States, or some combination of all of the above.70
Now that the UNHRC has been up and running since 2006, it is widely
seen to be—according to taste—ineffective, overly politicized, controlled
by voting blocs from the world’s despotic regimes, anti-Israel, anti-United
States, or some combination of all of the above. Some think the council
is even worse, even more dysfunctional, than its predecessor. Indeed, under
the George W. Bush Administration, the United States boycotted the
council, though that boycott was lifted by the Obama Administration.71
For our purposes here, the main feature of the council’s work to point
to is the periodic reviews—where the council assesses the human rights
situations in all 192 U.N. member states.72
Leave aside the obvious observation that the world’s Sudans, Libyas,
Chinas, Zimbabwes, Cubas, Irans, and Saudi Arabias are comparatively
unmoved by such periodic reviews. They might even get themselves
voted onto the UNHRC—as Libya has, Cuba has, China has, Kyrgyzstan
has, Pakistan has, Saudi Arabia has, and, well, you get the idea—in order to
hamper critical periodic reviews by forming voting or power blocs. But
even if a periodic review does come out that is critical, the world’s
authoritarian and theocratic states pay little attention. They are ineffective.73
Meanwhile if we turn to our four longstanding democracies of the
United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, the questions
of “Who gets appointed to staff these periodic reviews?”; “Do their
credentials make them better at spotting the rights-respecting course of
action in cases where smart, nice, reasonable people simply disagree
than the elected representatives of the people?”; and “Why should we

70. See id. at 87–88.
71. Colum Lynch, U.S. To Seek Seat on U.N. Human Rights Council, WASH.
POST, Apr. 1, 2009, at A2.
72. See ZIFCAK, supra note 61, at 67–74.
73. In a different vein, but still related to the theme of ineffectiveness, there was a
case of a Human Rights Council periodic review of a Pacific Island state that was
congratulated in its periodic review by a European state for decriminalizing homosexuality,
and in the same periodic review, the same Pacific Island state was criticized by an
Islamic state for, you guessed it, decriminalizing homosexuality. See U.N. High Comm’r for
Human Rights, Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence Against
Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, ¶¶ 40–44, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/19/41 (Nov. 17, 2011); Paul Canning, Seychelles To Decriminalise Homosexuality,
Other Countries Say No and ‘Not Yet,’ LGBT ASYLUM NEWS (Oct. 5, 2011), http://
madikazemi.blogspot.com/2011/10/seychelles-to-decriminalise.html.
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care what these periodic reviews allege?” simply cannot be answered in
a way that favors these U.N. bureaucrats over elected politicians.
But rather than pursue that particular aspect of international law’s
ineffectiveness, I want instead to do two other things. Firstly, I want to
contrast rights-related international law to a different sort of international
law and argue that that latter sort is anything but ineffective. It is very
effective indeed. So my criticisms in this Article, as I made clear at the
start, are directed at only some parts of the international law edifice. Then,
secondly, I want to focus on international criminal courts and suggest that
the case for their effectiveness is much less than many might assume.
For the first of those tasks, let us consider not a rights-related body but
rather a trade-related one. This is the World Trade Organization (WTO).74
The WTO grew out of GATT, or rather the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade treaty. Immediately after World War II, about two dozen
countries participated in the U.S.-propelled negotiations to cut tariffs.
These negotiations were independent of the rather grander attempt, the
failed attempt, to agree to the Havana Charter, which would establish
something that would be called the International Trade Organization or
ITO. The sideline GATT negotiations were completed in 1947, and GATT
was born in 1948.75 It was assumed it would be temporary, lapsing once
the Havana Charter came into force.76
However, when the Truman Administration in the United States decided
not to pursue congressional approval for the Havana Charter, only
GATT was left. And GATT was not only a document assumed by all and
sundry to be temporary, it was also a narrowly focused agreement aimed at
lowering tariffs. GATT entered into force in 1948, and that was all there
was for nearly half a century until the WTO was established in 1995.77 Yet
GATT still remains the most important legal document in international
trade law. The WTO agreement that grew out of the Uruguay Round did
not supplant or repeal the original GATT document; it merely complemented
and supplemented GATT.
Now a first thing to notice is that when supporters of rights-related
CRC-type or ICCPR-type international law try to make an analogy to
GATT and the WTO, remember this difference. GATT and the WTO
are ultimately focused on one thing, lowering—and perhaps one day even
eliminating altogether—tariffs. That is their aim, focus, and breadth of

74. For more detail on the WTO, see RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE 35–37 (3d ed. 2008).
75. See The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
76. See id.
77. Id.
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concern. It is a massively more circumscribed, contained, and inflationresistant one than some international convention that is pitched up in the
Olympian heights of emotively appealing and disagreement-finessing
moral abstractions—one that enumerates a list of vague, amorphous, and
indeterminate moral entitlements in the language of rights.78
Here is the next thing to notice about trade agreements. Nation-states
argue over every phrase, every word, and every comma. In the history
of GATT, there have been eight completed sets of rounds of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, all aimed at reducing trade barriers.79 These are
increasingly difficult to complete—the Doha Round began in 2001 and
is still yet to be completed80—for the very fact that they emphatically
do not deal in finessing disagreement under the cover of moral abstractions,
vagueness, and amorphousness. These trade rounds, to the contrary, deal in
spelling out in minute detail specifics; they enumerate and elaborate with
precision; and they aim to make clear up front what countries have
committed themselves to, and when. There is no sense of having aimed
for the woolliest, least demanding lowest common denominator, which
in obverse terms is to say that nondemocracies have as much at stake as
democracies, a situation wholly distinct from rights-related treaties.
Trade agreements, in other words, are driven by self-interest that flows
from a grasp of comparative advantage, an understanding that free
trade—not mercantilism—creates the new wealth that can later be allocated
as different countries choose, and a recognition that greater trade does
not much—contrary to some—reduce the power of domestic governments.
If you are in doubt about that last claim, take a visit to China some time
and experience for yourself how enfeebled, or otherwise, the Communist
Party government of China is. This is the government that has signed
China up to the WTO without any overly obvious inability to set domestic
policy across the board.
My point here is that the WTO process is one obsessed with detail and
trying to spell out probable future scenarios and commitments. It is one
78. I say this while conceding that the scope or potential for inflation in the newer
WTO TRIPS Agreement and the General Agreement on Trade in Services is greater than
it is as regards the older GATT aspects of the WTO.
79. The rounds include the Geneva Round in 1947, Annecy Round in 1949, Torquay
Round in 1951, Geneva Round in 1956, Dillon Round in 1960–1961, Tokyo Round in
1973–1979, and Uruguay Round in 1986–1994. The GATT Years: From Havana to
Marrakesh, supra note 75.
80. The Doha Round, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dd
a_e/dda_e.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
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that aims to be a “no surprises,” up-front process. It confronts disagreement
in order to generate tradeoff compromises; it does not finesse disagreements
for some later point-of-application interpreter to award the whole cake to
one side or the other.
Consider the approach to these GATT and WTO negotiations. They
take place on a product-by-product basis with a focus on reducing tariffs
and in the context of an overarching Most Favored Nation (MFN)
obligation found in Article I of GATT. The general goal, as I have said,
is to lower import barriers and to reduce export subsidies. The MFN
obligation requires member states to give the same lower-tariff deal or
concessions to all other member states that they give to their most favored
member state trading party. Against that background and even though
there are some exceptions to MFN treatment, you will see that this sort
of trading regime significantly dispenses with reciprocity—you cannot
demand something from country X in return for your lowering tariffs if
you have already lowered them for any other WTO member country.81
And any country can opt to leave the WTO, though none has done so.82
Again, nothing like that seems true of treaties and conventions related
to, say, the rights of the child, indigenous peoples, or the disabled. And
so this WTO process is less debilitating of democratic decisionmaking,
is arguably slightly more transparent—or less opaque—and is certainly
far more effective.
We can even see that there are more constraints on the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body panels and Appellate Body than you find when U.S. courts
are appealing to unratified treaties or the ICJ is indicating the reach of
customary international law. First off, in the WTO, there is no enforcement
mechanism the winners can use against the losers other than being paid
compensation or undertaking authorized retaliation—think of the EU’s
ban on genetically modified crops, which fails the trade test, but that failure,
or America’s winning at the WTO, cannot easily be used to change the
EU policy, which still exists.
Secondly, the extent of interpretive slippage in the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Understanding process at the appellate body stage has been
very slight indeed. At the WTO, we might see the appellate body allowing
NGOs to submit briefs in cases or decide who has the burden of proof or

81. Of course there is still a scintilla of reciprocity in the sense that when a state is
seeking to set its MFN tariff level for some particular product, it can, and often does,
enter into negotiations with its main trading partners to secure reciprocal concessions
that are then, post negotiations, all multilateralized via MFN. But I do not think that
takes away from my general point.
82. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art.
XV, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
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even, very rarely, cite eminent publicists. But that is the scope of the
slippage.
Most relevantly of all for our purposes here, when it comes to the
WTO, the outcomes are effective. They influence the conduct of member
states, democracies and nondemocracies. Nor does the WTO much affect
democratic decisionmaking. Almost all the constraints came in the form
of highly detailed and specific undertakings, not in the form of disagreementfinessing abstractions. Or put differently, a democratic government in the
past knew the exact detail—or rather almost all the detail—of what it
was agreeing to. There is little of the ratchet-up effect we have seen
elsewhere.
Perhaps I should sum up in especially blunt terms. The WTO, as a
supranational body, is much less democracy debilitating than rightsrelated supranational bodies. The deal is made up front. It is procedurally
easy to back out. There is far less scope for inflation-enhancing “living
document” interpretive approaches by those who judge disputes. Those
who breach their obligations face only the option of paying or authorized
retaliation. Widespread self-interest, in the form of the increasing
generation of wealth, at least partly aligns outlooks. Oh, and every country
has a veto on any changes—you need unanimity to change the bargain.
Hence some forms of international law are clearly very effective
indeed.
When it comes to the various international criminal courts, however, I
am much more skeptical of their effectiveness. To buttress that claim,
let me begin by returning for a minute to Hart. Recall Hart’s argument
at the end of chapter nine of The Concept of Law. 83 Hart was there
considering, in effect, the Nuremberg trials after World War II. Hart’s
point, with which I agree, is that the attempted natural law defenses of
those trials are unconvincing. The better, more convincing way of
understanding what was happening is that the victors after the war were
passing retrospective laws making illegal what had been legal under the
Nazi legal regime. This could be justified, thought Hart, whenever the
moral wrongness of using retrospective laws was clearly and unambiguously
outweighed by the moral wickedness of what the defendants had done in
the past under that former regime, which in Hart’s view and mine was
the case with the top Nazis but may well not have been the case if we

83.

HART, supra note 67, at 210–12.
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move forward in time and consider the prosecuting of, say, East German
border guards after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Now if that is the situation in the absence of any international treaty
dealing with the prosecuting of thuggish dictators and their cronies, one
can certainly see that there will be benefits in moving to a state of affairs
in which there exists a laid down, positive international law or treaty,
known in advance, that makes illegal at international law morally egregious
acts that were legal at the time under some jurisdiction’s municipal law.
This international law would authorize prosecutions of the top political
and military leaders who, under the domestic legal system that they
controlled, had done nothing illegal.
As I said, one can see the benefits of such an international criminal
court or law. Most obviously such an international law framework
removes the need—after the downfall of some nasty regime—to rely on
what are in effect retrospective laws to provide a basis for prosecuting
the worst offenders. I accept that benefit. My claim here will be only that
there are costs as well as benefits in making this move and hence that
there are also grounds for being skeptical about the effectiveness of any
such international criminal courts.84
Take the International Criminal Court (ICC), which came into being in
2002 when the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court came
into force.85 The costs that I would note are not that countries such as
the United States, China, and Israel have not ratified this treaty and show
no indication whatsoever of doing so. Nor would I focus too much on the
big expense of this court,86 with returns thus far that amount to one
conviction,87 under appeal,88 an acquittal, also under appeal,89 with two
dozen or so cases ongoing from thirty overall indictments.90 Nor, again,

84. I will focus on the International Criminal Court, but a similar sort of analysis
is possible with the one-off international tribunals for Rwanda and the ex-Yugoslavia.
85. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 91 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
86. See Jon Silverman, Ten Years, $900m, One Verdict: Does the ICC Cost Too
Much?, BBC NEWS, www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17351946 (last updated Mar. 14, 2012,
5:55 PM).
87. Thomas Lubanga, Congolese warlord, was found guilty and sentenced to
fourteen years in prison. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Decision on Sentence, ¶ 107 (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc
1438370.pdf.
88. See Lubanga Case, COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.iccnow.org/?
mod=drctimelinelubanga (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
89. See Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Prosecution’s
Appeal, ¶¶ 1–3 (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1531064.pdf.
90. See Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/
situations and cases/Pages/situations and cases.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
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would my criticism be the one some make that this court seems to focus
on only Africa.91
Instead I want to point out the incentives such a court throws up when
it comes to nasty people leading nasty regimes. Those incentives are
clear, namely that it is better to go down fighting than to strike some sort
of Idi Amin or Augusto Pinochet-type deal to forsake power. Now of
course it is galling in the extreme to see someone as criminally culpable
as Idi Amin leave power only to spend a decade or so in very comfortable
retirement in Saudi Arabia. Yet it is also the case that he did leave power
under that deal and that Uganda did move on without him. And if that is
seen as a benefit, that in some circumstances the lesser evil is to get the
thug out of power however galling the terms, then an international criminal
court makes that almost impossible to accomplish. Think of Zimbabwe
and Mugabe or Syria and Assad, and ask why they would ever voluntarily
relinquish power, however attractive the supposed deal. They know, we
know, that they will be tried under some sort of international law court,
either the ICC—if it has jurisdiction92—or some special one-off Rwanda
or ex-Yugoslavia-type tribunal if it does not. Knowing that, they will
not go; they cannot go, so they will fight to the end.
Those are bad consequences that surely must be part of any sensible
cost-benefit analysis of these sorts of international criminal courts and
tribunals. They put in place incentives that will have bad, as well as good,
consequences. Some will be unintended.
There is no easy answer to any of this. I merely note such ICC-type
regimes have various costs that can be lumped under this last heading of
mine of ineffectiveness.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this Article, I have tried to offer you a skeptical outsider’s view of
some aspects of international law. Perhaps the Article is best seen as an
agnostic’s guide to—too much—international law. Certainly there are
aspects of international law that are ineffective, opaque, and undemocratic.
And these IOUs are comparatively worse, and when it comes to democratic

91. See, e.g., Brendan O’Neill, The International Criminal Court Is, by Any
Objective Measurement, Racist. So Why Do Liberals Love It?, TELEGRAPH, http://blogs.
telegraph.co.uk/news/brendanoneill2/100144112/the-international-criminal-court-is-by
-any-objective-measurement-racist-so-why-do-liberals-love-it/ (last updated Mar. 15, 2012).
92. See Rome Statute, supra note 85, art. 5(1).

865

credentials, then far worse than one sees in the domestic law of such
longstanding democracies as the United States, Canada, Australia, and
the United Kingdom.
That is why I believe that a healthy dose of skepticism is warranted
when it comes to international law, and most especially rights-related
international law.
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